human rights drum

'Even admitting that human rights are both highly desirable and far more respected in 'our' countries than elsewhere, three fundamental conceptual problems remain. The first is the problem of transition. How can a society pass from a feudal or colonial situation, in which the very idea of human rights is not formulated, to a situation comparable to what we know in our societies today? And do we have something to teach the rest of the world in this matter? The second problem stems from the inclusion in the U.N.'s 1948 Declaration of two types of rights: individual and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the other. To what extent are these rights compatible with each other, and if they are not, are there priorities between them? The third problem concerns the effects and the moral value of the ritual denunciations of human rights violations in poor countries by various organisations in the rich countries.'

There are bold ideas in Jean Bricmont's book, some of which should make the human rights brigade sit up. One to make me do so was the hint of a suggestion that we - in the West - should refrain even from criticising the human rights violations of such regimes as the former Soviet Union yesterday, Uzbekistan, Burma or China today, because we ourselves went through a course of development which was at least as inhumane, and we have no better suggestions to offer them (his first point above). Bricmont's idea is more sophisticated, more multi-layered than that, but it was this aspect that made me wonder: does it have to be the case that if you made certain mistakes yourself, you cannot point them out when others seem to take the same path? Does it have to be the case that every country must pass through an inhumane course of development - can there be no other routes? Might it not be that our pointing out, from an outside point of view, might sometimes be a help in changing to another route; or might it not be that in recognising the mistakes we made - and still make - we might be able to ward off others from the same destructive course of development?

Of course, that is not in general the message sent out by the human rights brigade, let alone the humanitarian imperialists. But it should be, if they are to avoid the charges of hypocrisy and uselessness.

The second thought which made me wonder - and which touched an open nerve - was the hint of a suggestion that international do-gooders should keep themselves to themselves - or, as he puts it in another article: 'What we are mainly responsible for is the imperialism of our own countries. Let us start by tackling that - and effectively!'

There is also more than one strand to this second thought, and it isn't unrelated to the first point: who are we, after all, to teach the Chinese or the Russians or - worst of all - the inhabitants of our former colonies how to build democracy, how to protect human rights or how to do anything except effectively exploit others, and enrich ourselves at their expense? How can we imagine that if we cannot not get our own house in order, we could manage to restructure someone else's - and anyway, what right have we to try to do so? Most importantly, are we even justified in working around the globe, when many of the problems we are trying to address have arisen as a result of our own government's policy and practices, still continuing?

As long as we confine ourselves to Bricmont's main target in his book - the humanitarian imperialists who beat the human rights drum for war - it is not hard to agree with those two points. Certainly George Bush and Tony Blair, John Rentoul and Johann Hari are not in a position to do any of that preaching, nor is anyone else who has been implicated in beating the drum, or has tapped their foot to the beat while others do so. But having spent the last 15 years trying on a very small scale to 'educate for human rights', mostly overseas, I am still (just) resisting the idea that it was both hypocritical and ineffective. I am, however, close to tipping point.

Bricmont goes further than merely pointing out the hypocrisy of the human rights warmongers, or, as he calls them, the humanitarian imperialists:

'The moderate versions of the human rights ideology, those which do not necessarily advocate war but encourage intervention in one form or another in various Third World Countries, or steady denunciation of whatever is going on there, should also be subjected to criticism. This is because, by harping on certain aspects and overlooking others, they create a distorted vision of the world that enables the tough version of human rights ideology to prosper and marginalises opposition to imperial wars.

Here, and at various other points, he makes veiled but obvious criticisms of organisations like Amnesty International - and their foot soldiers - suggesting that the pressure that the organisation brings to bear on so-called rogue states is dependent on, and in its turn reinforces, the existing hierarchy of nations. The pressure is only effective, he suggests, when it is applied by citizens of richer nations, and it works indirectly, through their governments, and as a result of the power - and the riches - of those richer nations. Again, the suggestion is that as individuals, we might be better tackling that hierarchy and the problems it creates, rather than busy-bodying about the globe, sticking elastoplast on its victims.

So the big questions Bricmont that leaves me with, and to which I shall return, are the following:

1. If we are intent on teaching the Russians (Burmese / Chinese / Iraqis) or preaching to them, are we certain that have anything useful to say, given our own country's ignoble course of development and current behaviour? For me this is partly a question of who 'we' are (government, activist, or merely preacher) and what sort of experience we are drawing on. Plus, of course, whether it is at all relevant to those who have to listen to our lectures.

2. How hypocritical is it of us (whoever 'we' may be) to do so, given who we are and where we come from? In particular, can we do so in good faith given the appalling human rights crimes being committed by our own governments right now?

3. How relatively useless is it to travel the globe with elastoplast when our own governments are taking advantage of the lack of resistance at home to send arms, weapons, armies and murderous economic policies in general to those places where the human rights brigade is working? Would it not be better to stay at home and stop the weapons being sent at all, or to pressurise our government to carry out a genuinely ethical foreign policy. This, for me, is the most difficult charge to answer.

4. Leaving aside the preaching for a moment, can condemnation of other countries' human rights records be (cost) effective, justified, and not too patronising nor counter-productive in terms of 'marginalising opposition to imperial wars' (or to the other crimes committed outside our borders).

5. Then finally there is the question which Bricmont doesn't raise, but which I have raised on numerous occasions, to do with whether financial resources which have been allocated to 'do good' are in fact best spent on international do-gooders (rather than on those who are genuinely in need). This for me is the least troublesome question to address: in general they are not.